A realy entertaining piece by Errata Security where Robert Graham ghetto reverse the current controversial superfish of Lenovo.
(if you have been living under a rock
The goal is to set the right break point before it actually infects your machine -- reversers have been known to infect themselves this way.
his ghetto way of reversing is first to infect himself with the "virus" and then using procdump to dump the process memory. Then dumping all the strings that the memory contains with the tool
strings and voila. You have have the private certificate in the clear.
But the private certificate is protected by a passphrase. But apparently not, it was just protected by a password contained in the memory in clear as well...
I advise you to read the article, it comes with screenshots and nice commands that use text processing tools:
grep "^[a-z]*$" super.txt | sort | uniq > super.dict
spoiler alert, the password to protect the certificate is komodia the name of the company who created this mitm adware.
Note that if they would have used an RSA whitebox this would not have happened... so quickly.
An amazing story by Scott Aaronson on Big Numbers.
Keywords: exponential growth, NP-complete problems, Ackermann sequence, Turing Machine, Halting Problem, Busy Beaver,
some quotes :)
In an old joke, two noblemen vie to name the bigger number. The first, after ruminating for hours, triumphantly announces "Eighty-three!" The second, mightily impressed, replies "You win."
Consider, for example, the oft-repeated legend of the Grand Vizier in Persia who invented chess. The King, so the legend goes, was delighted with the new game, and invited the Vizier to name his own reward. The Vizier replied that, being a modest man, he desired only one grain of wheat on the first square of a chessboard, two grains on the second, four on the third, and so on, with twice as many grains on each square as on the last. The innumerate King agreed, not realizing that the total number of grains on all 64 squares would be 264-1, or 18.6 quintillion—equivalent to the world’s present wheat production for 150 years.
Rado called this maximum the Nth "Busy Beaver" number. (Ah yes, the early 1960’s were a more innocent age.)
To solve the Halting Problem for super machines, we’d need an even more powerful machine: a ‘super duper machine.’ And to solve the Halting Problem for super duper machines, we’d need a ‘super duper pooper machine.’
If we could run at 280,000,000 meters per second, there’d be no need for a special theory of relativity: it’d be obvious to everyone that the faster we go, the heavier and squatter we get, and the faster time elapses in the rest of the world. If we could live for 70,000,000 years, there’d be no theory of evolution, and certainly no creationism: we could watch speciation and adaptation with our eyes, instead of painstakingly reconstructing events from fossils and DNA. If we could bake bread at 20,000,000 degrees Kelvin, nuclear fusion would be not the esoteric domain of physicists but ordinary household knowledge.
But do people fear big numbers? Certainly they do. I’ve met people who don’t know the difference between a million and a billion, and don’t care. We play a lottery with ‘six ways to win!,’ overlooking the twenty million ways to lose. We yawn at six billion tons of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere each year, and speak of ‘sustainable development’ in the jaws of exponential growth.
A pretty fresh article on how you could use crypto to replace a lot of complicated schemes you might use on your website like password reset or mail confirmation:
tl;dr: instead of creating a table for tokens, you could create the password reset url like this:
and at the place of the token you would put the output of a MAC. Checking the MAC again after receiving the url would confirm that YOU created that url and it has not been modified. Remember, MAC provides integrity and authentication. The author also provides a way to only render this usable once: use the original hashed password as a nonce.
After some evidences of the Silk Road trial got out, Gwern noticed a PGP key was in here...
This is the ASCII-armored private key of the main DPR public key, the one he signed forum posts with and messaged with people. I was surprised to see it screenshotted like that, and I thought it would be hilarious if I could take the private key and announce that I was actually the real DPR by signing it with his key (since I've occasionally been accused of it).
more on the story here
I'm using cmder on windows, it's pretty and it comes with a lot of unix tools (cat, ls, bash, ssh, more, grep...) and pipes and streams and... I can use vim in the console. Not emacs, vim. I do have emacs on windows but I don't think I can do a
emacs -nw to just use it from the console. So let's go back to learn vim, because I hate being slow. And here is a nice way of doing it!
you can find several pictures of a keyboard aiming at teaching you step by step how vim works. This is all I needed!
Silk Road's trial just closed and I ran into this old (?) journal of Ross Ulbricht that contains quite a bunch of interesting passages. I think this will turn into a movie.
server was ddosed, meaning someone knew the real IP. I assumed they obtained it by becoming a guard node. So, I migrated to a new server and set up private guard nodes. There was significant downtime and someone has mentioned that they discovered the IP via a leak from lighttpd.
being blackmailed with user info. talking with large distributor (hell's angels).
commissioned hit on blackmailer with angels
got word that blackmailer was excuted
created file upload script
started to fix problem with bond refunds over 3 months old
got death threat from someone (DeathFromAbove)
withdrawals all caught up
made a sign error when fixing the bond refund bug, so several vendors had very negative accounts.
switched to direct connect for bitcoin instead of over ssh portforward
received visual confirmation of blackmailers execution
gave angels go ahead to find tony7
sent payment to angels for hit on tony76 and his 3 associates
04/21 - 04/30/2013
market and forums under sever DoS attack. Gave 10k btc ransom but attack continued.
attacker agreed to stop if I give him the first $100k of revenue and $50k per week thereafter. He stopped, but there
appears to be another DoS attack still persisting
paid $100k to attacker
paid the attacker $50k
rewrote orders page
paid attacker $50k weekly ransom
$2M was stolen from my mtgox account by DEA
09/19 - 09/25/2013
red got in a jam and needed $500k to get out. ultimately he convinced me to give it to him, but I got his ID first and
had cimon send harry, his new soldier of fortune, to vancouver to get $800k in cash to cover it. red has been mainly
out of communication, but i haven't lost hope. Atlantis shut down. I was messaged by one of their team who said they
shut down because of an FBI doc leaked to them detailing vulnerabilities in Tor.
Had revelation about the need to eat well, get good sleep, and meditate so I can stay positive and productive.
All of this sounds so surreal. He is making a huge amount of money for sure. A million dollars doesn't seem much for him. He is constantly buying servers and he seems to be coding a lot. He also seem like a normal dude.
And here's a funny thread on who's Variety Jones
here's an entertaining piece about NSA backdoors through history: http://ethanheilman.tumblr.com/post/70646748808/a-brief-history-of-nsa-backdoors
1997 Lotus Notes: The NSA requested that Lotus weaken its cryptography so that the NSA could break documents and emails secured by Lotus notes. This Software was used by citizens, companies and governments worldwide.
I talked about this one here.
A kleptographic attack is an attack which uses asymmetric encryption to implement a cryptographic backdoor. For example, one such attack could be to subtly modify how the public and private key pairs are generated by the cryptosystem so that the private key could be derived from the public key. In a well-designed attack, the outputs of the infected cryptosystem would be computationally indistinguishable from the outputs of the corresponding uninfected cryptosystem. If the infected cryptosystem is a black-box implementation such as a hardware security module, a smartcard, or a Trusted Platform Module, a successful attack could go completely unnoticed.
I've seen implementations of this in the wild, here on reddit (python) and here on lobsters (C#)
Here's a funny topic on CS Theory StackExchange: https://cstheory.stackexchange.com/questions/4491/powerful-algorithms-too-complex-to-implement?newreg=dbe44b3dd8ca41019f6a4a23b9fea6d3
What are some algorithms of legitimate utility that are simply too complex to implement?
Here's an awesome explanation of shellshock: https://bitbucket.org/carter-yagemann/shellshock/src/f0a88573f912?at=master
This repository contains useful documents which I have written to help educate the cybersecurity community on the "ShellShock" bash vulnerability. These documents are designed to help facilitate learning, including on how to identify possibly vulnerable services and how to remediate such vulnerabilities.
It's actually the clearest explanation I've seen on the subject.
Made by these guys from Syracuse:
- Carter Yagemann
- Amit Ahlawat
Excellent finding from Adam Back.
If I understand the article correctly, when exporting encrypted content with Lotus-Notes, 24 bits of the 64 bits key would be encrypted under one of the NSA's public key and then appended to the encrypted content (I guess). This would allow NSA to decrypt those 24 bits of key with their corresponding private key and they would then have to brute force only 40 bits instead of 64 bits.
This shouldn't allow any bad attacker to get any advantage if they don't know the NSA's private key to decrypt those bits. And if they do acquire it, and they do decrypt 24bits of key, they would still have to have the computing power to brute force 40 bits of key. I have no idea what I'm talking about but I have the feeling the NSA might be the most powerful computing power when it comes to brute forcing ciphers.
$cur = 'plaintext'
$cur = md5($cur)
$salt = randbytes(20)
$cur = hmac_sha1($cur, $salt)
$cur = cryptoservice::hmac($cur)
[= hmac_sha256($cur, $secret)]
$cur = scrypt($cur, $salt)
$cur = hmac_sha256($cur, $salt)
the explanation is here
tl;dr: the md5 is here for legacy purpose, cryptoservice::hmac is to add a secret salt, scrypt (which is a kdf not a hash) is for slowing brute force attempts and the sha256 is here for shortening the output.
Amazing article on the verge about how the army created a song hiding a message ("19 people rescued. You’re next. Don’t lose hope") so that hostages of the FARC could hear it on the radio.
This is a genius idea for concealing a message! Not really crypto, but kinda cool none the less. I knew about Stenography and I also posted about transforming your message into spam as a way of hiding your message, but this is cool on a different level. Even the song is catchy ^_^
There was this disturbing video of a captive soldier in a North Vietnamese prison who when forced to do a fake interview, blinked the Morse Code 'T-O-R-T-U-R-E'.
Zokis wrote some tests on python, showing that a difference in declarations and simple syntax do have implications in the size of the program and the rapidity of execution.
For example writing
a, b = 0, 1 seems faster than doing
a = 0 then
b = 1
Using chained conditions like
a < b < 0 seems faster than doing
a < b and b < 0
etc... you can find all the tests here
The differences seem negligible though. dis and timeit were used to quantify the tests.
Also here are two useful python arguments:
python -c cmd : program passed in as string (terminates option list)
# python -c "print 'haha'"
-i : inspect interactively after running script; forces a prompt even
if stdin does not appear to be a terminal; also PYTHONINSPECT=x
# python -i -c "a = 5"
According to the US government, yes they did:
the FBI now has enough information to conclude that the North Korean government is responsible for these actions
What do security experts think about that?
Here's a piece from Marc Roger called No, North Korea Didn’t Hack Sony. So you can guess what the director of security operations for DEFCON and principal security researcher of Cloudflare is thinking.
What about Schneier? Read about it here
I worry that this case echoes the "we have evidence -- trust us" story that the Bush administration told in the run-up to the Iraq invasion. Identifying the origin of a cyberattack is very difficult, and when it is possible, the process of attributing responsibility can take months.
What about Robert Graham? his article's title is as usual pretty straight forward: The FBI's North Korea evidence is nonsense
So there is some kind of consensus that the FBI's announcement is abrupt and shady...
To dig further... Nicholas Weaver posted an interesting article. Kurt Baumgartner as well.