Mtgox, which is frozen while it is trying to fix its problems, has issued a press released explaining what is the problem
Bitcoin transactions are subject to a design issue that has been largely ignored, while known to at least a part of the Bitcoin core developers and mentioned on the BitcoinTalk forums. This defect, known as "transaction malleability" makes it possible for a third party to alter the hash of any freshly issued transaction without invalidating the signature, hence resulting in a similar transaction under a different hash. Of course only one of the two transactions can be validated. However, if the party who altered the transaction is fast enough, for example with a direct connection to different mining pools, or has even a small amount of mining power, it can easily cause the transaction hash alteration to be committed to the blockchain.
thread on bitcointalk forum
The The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) has just released several handy cheat sheet about security in diverse languages, situations, platforms... you name it.
You can find them here
This is a story about 5 Low-Severity bugs I pulled together to create a simple but high severity exploit, giving me access to private repositories on Github.
the full story
discussion on HN
Ken Shirriff has posted an amazing post on his blog on how he managed to manually make (meaning, he didn't use the official bitcoin application) a transaction in the bitcoin ecosystem.
I'm reading through it as I'm typing this, and it's really well explained, you get to see exactly what he does in Python and there are pictures!
you can read it here
Jean-Jacques Quisquater, a renowned Belgian professor in cryptography got his computer hacked, seems like NSA has something to do about it.
So this guy owned @N on twitter and got extorted his account by a phishing attack.
The story is well written and you should read it here : https://medium.com/p/24eb09e026dd
but for a tl;dr the attacker called his paypal account to ask them for his credit card's last 4 digits. Then he called godaddy to ask them to reset the password. They only asked him for the 2 first digits and the last 4s. The attacker just had to guess the 2 first digits (and he did it on the first try, he could have kept calling and trying otherwise).
Now that he had @N's domain's name, he could now see his emails. Took over @N's facebook account and started mailing him "threats".
It's pretty crazy how easy phishing is.
I have to code a whitebox using DES encryption in a class. Which is pretty cool (I would have prefered doing it with AES but the other group got tails and we got heads).
Here is where the Stanford course I passed on Coursera shines. The explanation of DES on it is brilliant. I was wondering about the initial and final permutations that occurs in the algorithm though and Dan Boneh doesn't really talk about it besides saying it's not for cryptographic purposes.
I found a solution on a new sub-stackoverflow dedicated to Cryptography : http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/3/what-are-the-benefits-of-the-two-permutation-tables-in-des